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Traditionally, our government officials have enjoyed special status under the law.' Depending upon the functions they performed,
officials were able to claim either absolute or qualified immunity from
civil damages liability for discretionary acts. 2 Absolute immunity is
available to government officials if the officials' actions are performed
in pursuance of their duties, and thus acts as a complete bar to a
lawsuit. 3 Qualified immunity, in contrast, is available to government
officials only if they are able to demonstrate that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that their actions were warranted and that their
4
conduct was neither motivated by malice nor bad faith.
5
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and its companion case, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,' the Supreme Court of the United States determined the
scope of civil damages immunity for actions taken by a former President and his Presidential aides. These two cases evolved from the
dismissal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald from his position as an Air Force
civilian management analyst. 7 Fitzgerald testified in 1968 before a
congressional subcommittee that development costs of the 3.4 billion
dollar C-5A transport airplane were over the proposed budget by
approximately two billion dollars.' Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald's job
was abolished as the result of what the Air Force termed a "departmental reorganization and reduction in force. '"
Fitzgerald's dismissal due to its retaliatory overtones generated
concern in Congress and publicity in the press.' 0 In 1969, President
I See generally Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of
Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 281 (providing overview of cases involving
immunity defenses for government officials).
2 Id. at 318.
3 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
4 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321- 22 (1975). But see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102
S. Ct. 2727, 2737-38 (1982).
5 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
6 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
7 See Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2693.
IId. at 2694. Fitzgerald testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Id.
9 Id. at 2693. The reorganization and corresponding reduction in force were purportedly
economical measures designed to promote departmental efficiency. Id.
10 Id. at 2693-94. The Subcommittee on Economy in Government held public hearings
concerning Fitzgerald fearing that he may have been dismissed from the Air Force due to his
congressional testimony. Id. at 2694.
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Nixon, when questioned at a news conference as to Fitzgerald's impending termination from the Air Force," assured the press that he
would inquire into the matter.' 2 Nixon's subsequent attempts to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment through White House Chief of
Staff H.R. Haldeman and Budget Director Robert Mayo encountered
much opposition within the Administration. 3 The resistance was evidenced by an internal memorandum written by White House aide
Alexander Butterfield' 4 to Haldeman concerning Fitzgerald's reemployment, wherein Butterfield suggested: "We should let him
[Fitzgerald] bleed, for a while at least."' 5
There apparently were no further efforts made to find alternative
employment for Fitzgerald following the Butterfield memorandum.",
Consequently, Fitzgerald filed an action with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) seeking reinstatement, 7 alleging that under the guise of
a reorganization he was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for his
congressional testimony.' 8 After encountering nearly three years of
litigation, 9 Fitzgerald was granted a public hearing before the CSC
after which the CSC recommended that Fitzgerald be reappointed to
his former position or comparable employment, with back pay. 20 The
Commission found that the "dismissal had offended applicable civil

I Id.
12

Id.

Id.
14Alexander Butterfield was Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff to
H.R. Haldeman. Butterfield coordinated White House staff activities. On November 4, 1969, he
was appointed Secretary to the Cabinet. In March of 1973, Butterfield left the White House to
become administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Brief for Petitioners at 3-4,
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald].
" Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2695. The memorandum stated in pertinent part: "Fitzgerald is no
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks in loyalty; and after all,
loyalty is the name of the game." Id. at 2694.
16 Id.
17 Id.
's Id.
'9 Id. The CSC held a closed hearing on May 4, 1971. Since Fitzgerald wished to have the
Commission conduct a public hearing, he brought suit and won an injunction requiring the
proceedings to be open to the press and the public. See Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Public hearings then began on January 26, 1973. Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2695.
20 Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2696. Fitzgerald was offered a new job with the Defense Department
following the CSC order. Since he considered this position to be inferior to his former position,
Fitzgerald filed an enforcement action in the district court which was later settled. Under the
terms of this settlement, Fitzgerald was reinstated to his former employment as Management
Systems Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, effective June 21, 1982. Id. at 2696
n.17.
13
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service regulations" 21 and that the Administration's action was
prompted by "reasons purely personal to" Fitzgerald. 2 The CSC,
however, noted that the record did not indicate that Fitzgerald's
position had been eliminated in retaliation for his congressional testimony.23
Although the CSC awarded Fitzgerald reemployment and back
pay, it was not empowered to provide compensatory damages (excluding back pay), interest on the judgment, or attorney's fees. 24 As a
result, Fitzgerald filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia seeking 3.5 million dollars in compensatory and
punitive damages for the alleged retaliatory firing, 25 arguing that the
26
Commission's partial relief was not a substitute for such damages.
Fitzgerald named as defendants Defense Department officials, White
House aide Alexander Butterfield, and unidentified White House
aides pleaded as "John Does." 27 The court dismissed the action under
the District of Columbia's three year statute of limitations after determining that the suit was commenced four years after Fitzgerald's job
had been eliminated. 28 The court of appeals affirmed the dismissals as

21 Id. at 2695-96. Fitzgerald's employment placed him within the excepted service category
which normally indicated that he was not protected by civil service rules and regulations
applicable to removals. Id. at 2696 n. 15. His status as a veteran, however, entitled him to special
protections. One benefit afforded veterans was that: "an agency may take [adverse action)
against an employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." Veterans'
Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (Supp. III 1979). Since he was a veteran, Fitzgerald was also
protected by civil service reduction in force procedures. See id. §§ 3501-3502 (1976 & Supp. III

1979).
22 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2696. The CSC found that this was an improper basis for a reduction
in force. Although Fitzgerald's superiors had expressed dissatisfaction with his job performance,
the CSC did not decide whether " 'adverse action ' " could be taken against Fitzgerald as an
" 'inadequate or unsatisfactory employee.' " Id. at 2696 n. 16. The Commission held, however,
that the Civil Service Commission's adverse action procedures, codified at 5 C.F.R. §§ 752. 101.606 (1981), prohibited the Air Force from utilizing force reduction as a justification for dismissing Fitzgerald when the actual reasons pertained to his nonoffice-related performance. See
Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2696 n.16.
23 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2696.
24 Brief for Respondent at 43, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
25 Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1974), modified, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
26 See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
27 Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 691 (D.D.C. 1974), modified, 553 F.2d 220
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
28 See id. at 690. The district court found that the three year statute of limitations barred the
action notwithstanding Fitzgerald's allegation that a continuing conspiracy existed. See id. at
698. The district court rejected Fitzgerald's allegations of continuing injury noting that he had
failed to allege any wrongful conduct for the three years prior to the commencement of the
action. See id. Additionally, the court found plaintiffs allegation of a cover-up and defendant's
fraudulent concealment of material facts after Fitzgerald's firing irrelevant, see id., reasoning
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to all defendants but Butterfield, stating that the action against him
was not time-barred since it was reasonable that Fitzgerald would not
have discovered White House involvement in his termination until
1973.2 The Butterfield memorandum had been made public in that
year and raised "reasonable grounds for suspicion." 30 Accordingly, the
3
action against Butterfield was remanded for continued proceedings. 1
After extensive discovery, it became apparent that Nixon and
White House aide Bryce Harlow 32 may have been involved in
Fitzgerald's dismissal. 33 Former President Richard Nixon, 34 Harlow,
and other officials of the Nixon Administration were added as defendants for their participation in the alleged conspiracy to deprive
3 5
Fitzgerald of his job and subsequent reemployment.

that plaintiff was aware of the essential facts alleged in his suit before the statute of limitations
had run. Id.
29 See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court reasoned that
Fitzgerald had failed to bring timely action against the higher ranking defense officials although
he had been aware of their conduct. Therefore, it would be unjust to permit initiation of an
action against the lower ranking "John Does" because their identities and roles in the conspiracy
were earlier unknown. See id. The action would not have been time-barred, according to the
court, if Fitzgerald had sued the alleged conspirators known to him within the three year statute
of limitations period and then added other defendants whose identities he learned during the
course of the suit. See id.
30 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2696. On August 31, 1973 during the Watergate hearings of the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, the Butterfield memorandum,
dated January 20, 1970, was released to the public. Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 225
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
31 See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
32 Bryce Harlow was a Presidential aide primarily responsible for congressional relations
from January 20, 1969 until November 4, 1969. In November of 1969 he was appointed
Counsellor to the President and continued to work at that position in the Nixon Administration
until December 9, 1970 at which time he returned to private life. Harlow later served as
Counsellor from July 1, 1973 through April 14, 1974. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2730 & n.1.
Fitzgerald claimed that Harlow remained involved in the conspiracy throughout this entire
period. Id.
Brief for Petitioners, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 11.
3 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2697. Nixon's involvement in the Fitzgerald matter evolved from a
press conference in 1973 during which the former President acknowledged personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's firing by stating:
I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to
resign. I approved it and Mr. Seamans [Secretary of the Air Force] must have been
talking to someone who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case of
some person down the line deciding he should go. It was a decision that was
submitted to me. I made it and I stick by it.
Id. at 2695. The day after this press conference, a White House press spokesman retracted the
President's statement and announced that Nixon was referring to another former executive
employee whom he had mistaken for Fitzgerald. Id.
" See id. at 2697. Harlow's involvement in the alleged conspiracy was adduced from a series
of conversations in which he discussed Fitzgerald's termination with Secretary of the Air Force
Robert Seamans. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2730 & n.2. Other evidence included a recorded
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In March of 1980, Nixon and former aides Harlow and Butterfield, in separate motions for summary judgment, pleaded absolute
immunity as a bar to trial and as a complete defense for their official
actions. 36 The defendants argued in the alternative that they were
entitled to a qualified immunity from suit because Fitzgerald had
produced no evidence demonstrating that they had engaged in any
wrongful behavior. 37 The district court rejected each defendant's
claim of absolute immunity and ruled that genuine issues of fact
precluded summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue. 38 Furthermore, the court determined that Fitzgerald's complaint stated a
valid claim under the first amendment to the United States Constitution and two federal statutes. 39 The first of these statutes, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7211, protects the right of federal employees to supply information
to Congress or its individual members, 40 while the second statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1505, provides that interference with congressional testimony is a crime. 4' The district court observed that neither statute
explicitly granted an individual the right to bring a private suit for
damages. Nevertheless, Fitzgerald was able to infer a cause of action
under these two statutes. 42 Nixon and his former aides separately
appealed the portion of the order denying absolute immunity.4 3 The
appellate court summarily dismissed the appeals 44 and the Supreme
4
Court granted certiorari on June 22, 1981. 5
In Nixon, the Supreme Court held that the former President was
absolutely immune from civil damages liability based on his official

conversation between Nixon and his Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler in which the former President seemed to recall that Harlow supported firing Fitzgerald. Id. at 2730-31 & n.3.
11 Brief for Petitioners, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra note 14, at 12.
37 Id.
38 Id.
11 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2697. Fitzgerald had argued that his retaliatory firing violated his first
amendment rights of free speech and petition. Brief for Respondent at 43, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
40 See 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976).
42 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2697 n.20.
41 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2729.
44 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2697. The court of appeals apparently dismissed the appeals based on
its decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aJJ'd by an equally divided
vote, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2697. In Halperin, the court ruled that high
ranking government officials, including former President Nixon, could invoke only a qualified
immunity defense in a civil action for damages predicated on their official acts. See Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a~f'd per curiam by an equally divided vote,
452 U.S. 713 (1981); see also infra text accompanying notes 87-99.
11 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 452 U.S. 959 (1981); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 452 U.S. 959 (1981) (cases
consolidated).

19831

NOTES

379

acts. 46 By virtue of the distinctive functions inherent in the Presidency,
the absolute immunity possessed by Nixon extended to all acts within
the " 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." 47 While granting
absolute immunity to Nixon, the Court in Harlow refused to do the
same for his former aides, Harlow and Butterfield, holding instead
that the Presidential assistants allegedly involved in the same conspir4
acy as Nixon enjoyed only qualified immunity. 1
An examination of Nixon and Harlow in light of the history of
immunity defenses underscores the significance of these decisions. The
Supreme Court has recognized that for the government to function
effectively, officials must be accorded some protection from civil liability. 49 In the landmark case of Spalding v. Vilas, ° the Postmaster
General was granted absolute immunity in a defamation action based
upon his official conduct.5 1 The Supreme Court stated that an improper motive on the part of the official was irrelevant since he had
not exceeded his authority. 5 2 The Court reasoned that exposing officials to civil actions in which aggrieved citizens sought monetary
compensation would place a considerable burden on the operation of
governmental affairs. 53 In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court
extended absolute immunity to other public officials including
judges,54 state prosecutors, 55 legislators, 56 and administrative hearing
57
officers exercising quasi-judicial functions.
While some officials enjoyed absolute immunity, others possessed
only qualified immunity from suits for damages predicated on their
official acts. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents 58 estabNixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2701.
Id. at 2705.
11 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2734. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration of
whether Fitzgerald's pretrial showings could withstand Harlow's and Butterfield's motions for
summary judgment. See id. at 2739-40.
o See Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2699.
o 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
s'See id. at 498.
52 Id. at 498-99.
53 Id. at 498.
54 See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judge absolutely
immune for all
judicial acts including those done erroneously, in excess of authority, or maliciously).
55 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutor absolutely
immune
when initiating and prosecuting criminal case).
5' See. e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (United States
Senators' and chief counsel's official activities within legislative activities absolutely protected);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators absolutely immune when acting
within scope of legislative activity).
57 See, e.g..
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (administrative hearing officers performing functions analogous to judges and prosecutors absolutely immune).
-1 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4'
17

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:374

lished that a victim of a constitutional violation by a federal officer
was entitled to sue that official for monetary damages.5 9 In Bivens, a
civil action was instituted against federal narcotics agents for an
alleged violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.6 ° Without a warrant, the federal
officers had searched Bivens' apartment and arrested him for possession of narcotics. 61 The Supreme Court held that Bivens had suffered a
compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest, thus permitting him to invoke the federal question jurisdiction of the district
court to obtain monetary damages against the federal officials. 6 2 The
Court held that even absent a federal statute expressly creating the
cause of action, a violation of the Constitution implied a damage
63
remedy.
Whereas the Bivens Court reevaluated the immunity status of
federal officers, the Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,6 4 examined
the scope of immunity which state executive officials enjoyed when
sued for constitutional violations. Scheuer emerged from the killing of
three Kent State University students by the Ohio National Guard.6 5
Representatives of the deceased students' estates brought actions under
42 U.S.C. § 198366 against the governor and other state officials.6 7
The Court recognized that the broad discretionary responsibilities of
the state officials required some form of immunity from suits for
damages. 6 8 The Court rejected the officials' claim of absolute immu51 See id. at 397.
60 See id. at 389.
61 Id.
02

See id. at 397.

61 See id. at 396. The Bivens Court determined that the damage remedy, being one of the
remedies normally available for invasion of personal interests, should be no less available when
the personal rights invaded arise under the Constitution. See id. at 395-96. Justice Harlan
maintained that the lack of congressional legislative authorization of these actions was irrelevant
since the Constitution created the rights under which plaintiff sought a remedy. See id. at 399406 (Harlan, J., concurring). This nonauthorization is irrelevant if there has been "no explicit
congressional declaration" that individuals injured by a government official's violation of the
Constitution may not rely on a specified remedy, "but must instead be remitted to another
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.'" Id. at 397.
After holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, the Court remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that the federal agents,
although not absolutely immune to suit, could claim the defenses of good faith and probable
cause. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972).
64 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
65 See id. at 234.
66 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). This statute authorizes damage actions against officials
who, acting under color of state law, violate constitutional rights.
67 416 U.S. at 234. The other state officials included senior and subordinate officers of Ohio's
National Guard and the President of Kent State University, a state regulated school. See id.
6s See id. at 247.
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nity, however, concluding that the defendants were entitled to assert
only a good-faith or qualified immunity defense.6 9 The Scheuer Court
provided that the liability of a state executive official was contingent
upon whether the official knew or reasonably should have known that
the actions in which he engaged pursuant to his responsibility and
discretion violated the Constitution.7 ° The majority acknowledged
that high ranking officials required greater protection than those with
less complex discretionary responsibilities. 7" Nevertheless, to ensure
that private rights were not abused through the exercise of discretionary responsibilities, the Court assured that judicial review would be
exercised faithfully over those actions of state officials which may fall
outside protected areas of immunity. 72 The Scheuer Court justified
recognition of immunity defenses as a public policy measure necessary
to promote the efficient functioning of government. 73 The Court reasoned, however, that the purpose of section 1983 would be frustrated
if all state government officials' acts were totally immune from liability.74

In Wood v. Strickland,75 the Supreme Court once again considered the scope of immunity enjoyed by state officials in a section 1983
action. High school students who had been expelled from school for
violating a school regulation prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating beverages at school or school functions alleged that the school
board members who had ordered their expulsion violated the students'
constitutional rights. 76 In holding that the school officials could only
assert a qualified, good-faith immunity defense, 77 the Court determined that an official was not shielded from civil damages liability if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the actions taken
pursuant to his official responsibility violated the constitutional rights
of individuals. 78 Furthermore, if the official had acted with malicious
intent to either deprive an individual of constitutional rights or to
cause the individual injury, the official was not entitled to invoke the
7
qualified, good-faith immunity defense. 9
247-48.
Id. at 247; accord Mover v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909).
71 See 416 U.S. at 247; see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959) (plurality
opinion).
72 See 416 U.S. at 248-49; accord Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932).
73 416 U.S. at 242; accord Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959) (plurality opinion).
7 See 416 U.S. at 248.
7" 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
76 Id. at 309-10.
77 Id. at 322.
78 Id.; accord Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
79 Id.
69 Id. at
70

382
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Although Scheuer and Strickland involved section 1983 actions
against state officials, the Court's approach in these cases was extended to a suit against federal executive officials for constitutional
violations in Butz v. Economou.8 0 In Butz, the Court considered the
scope of immunity available to various Department of Agriculture
officials for allegedly instituting retaliatory proceedings against a
commodities exchange merchant for his criticism of the Department's
policies. 8 ' The Court termed unacceptable the argument that all high
ranking federal officials were absolutely immune from constitutional
damage actions.8 2 The majority reasoned that to grant such protection
to all federal executive officials who exercised discretion would vitiate
a Bivens-type action.8 3 Accordingly, the Court extended the Scheuer
rationale of expansive qualified immunity to an executive branch
official-the Secretary of Agriculture.8 4 In refusing to extend the common-law absolute immunity accorded federal executive officials for
their acts resulting in constitutional violations, the Butz Court stated
that federal officials generally enjoyed only the same qualified immunity available to state officials in section 1983 cases.8 5 Nevertheless,
the Court observed that absolute immunity may apply in special
instances if it "is essential for the conduct of the public business.","
The Butz Court distinguished executive officials performing
purely administrative functions from executive officials performing
quasi-judicial functions, finding that only the latter were entitled to
absolute immunity. 7 In drawing this distinction, the Court reaffirmed earlier Supreme Court holdings which acknowledged that certain officials, because they performed "special functions," were absolutely immune from liability. 88 Cabinet members, because they

" 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Scheuer, therefore, formulated the test to determine the liability of
state and federal executive branch officials who allegedly violated an individual's constitutional
rights. See id. at 506-07.
11 See id. at 481-82. Butz involved an action brought against the Secretary and Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture, an administrative judicial officer, and a chief hearing examiner. Id. at
478. An amended complaint named a number of officials in the Commodity Exchange Authority, an Agriculture Department attorney, and several auditors as additional defendants. See id.
at 480.
82 See id. at 485.
83 See id. at 501.
11 See id. at 507.
85 Id. at 500; accord Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aJJ'd by an
equally divided vote, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
88 438 U.S. at 507; accord Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
"1 438 U.S. at 508-17.
8 Id. at 508; see, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
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performed functions not requiring total protection, failed to qualify
for absolute immunity, while administrative hearing officers, engaging in functions similar to those of judges and prosecutors, qualified
for absolute immunity.8 9
While Scheuer, Strickland, and Butz suggested that state and
federal executive officials were entitled to only qualified immunity,
the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United
States remained uncertain. For nearly two hundred years there were
virtually no reported civil damages actions against a President.90 The
scope of Presidential immunity from liability in civil damages suits
was finally addressed by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Halperin v. Kissinger.9 ' In Halperin, ten high
ranking Government officials, including former President Nixon,
were sued for installing and maintaining an illegal wiretap on the
Halperins' home telephone. 2 Morton Halperin, a former member of
the National Security Council staff, and his family alleged that the
wiretap had violated their fourth amendment rights as well as Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.1 3 The
wiretap allegedly was an attempt by defendants to locate the source of
classified Government information leaks. 4 In rejecting this justification for defendants' actions, the D.C. Circuit court held that Richard
Nixon, John Mitchell, and H.R. Haldeman were not absolutely immune from liability in a Bivens-type action.9 5 The court noted that the
status of President did not place Nixon above the other high ranking

89 438 U.S. at 507-17. An administrative hearing officer, according to the Court, had to be
able to exercise independent judgment without fear of personal liability. See id. at 513. Similarly, a federal agency attorney or investigator had to be permitted to exercise discretion in
initiating a hearing or prosecution without the threat of harassment through a civil suit for
damages. See id. at 515.
10 See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2706 n. 1 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Prior to the 1970's, there was
one case in which a party sought civil damages from a President for his actions in office. See
Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (trespass action against
Thomas Jefferson dismissed because filing occurred in wrong district).
-1 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), af'd per curiam by an equally divided vote, 452 U.S. 713
(1981).

11 Id. at 1195. Other defendants included former Attorney General John Mitchell, National
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, Presidential aides H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Alexander Haig and Jeb Magruder, FBI Director Clarence Kelley, FBI official William Sullivan, and
Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian. Id.
" Id. Title III limits government use of electronic surveillance techniques. It "bans most
electronic surveillance and specifies procedures for wiretapping and eavesdropping in particular
situations; but the statute expressly does not limit the President's constitutional power to wiretap
in national security situations." Id. at 1202; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).

o See 606 F.2d at 1195-96.
o See id. at 1208.
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executive officials named as defendants.9 6 The former President and
his codefendants were permitted to claim only a qualified immunity-the court reasoning that this limited immunity sufficiently protected a President since a plaintiff would have difficulty stating a
cause of action which would defeat this limited defense.9 7 The majority, adopting the Strickland rationale, determined that the President
would lose his qualified immunity "only if plaintiffs could show that
he acted with 'actual malice' or that he failed to meet a statutory or
constitutional obligation that was clear under the circumstances as
understood at the time."918
The court of appeals asserted that there existed no constitutional
justification for granting the former President absolute immunity.9"
Moreover, separation of powers did not mandate that Nixon be immune from judicial process. 00 According to the Halperin court, a
decision holding a President liable for a violation of a constitutional
right would not significantly impair his ability to govern effectively. ' 0'
The court also noted that litigation would not place a special burden
on the President's personal finances since the Government would
represent him in suits based on his official actions. 102 Finally, the court
reasoned that our "tradition of equal justice under law" required that
Nixon be accorded only qualified immunity. 0 3 It was against this
historical background that Nixon and Harlow were decided.
Before addressing the immunity issue, the Nixon Court considered two jurisdictional challenges raised by Fitzgerald. The former
President attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 which grants the Court authority to review
cases in the courts of appeals. 0 4 The appellate court dismissed Nixon's
appeal of the "interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity" for lack of jurisdiction. 105 Based on that dismissal, Fitzgerald
argued that the district court's order was not an appealable case

91 See id. at 1210-11.
97 Id. at 1213.
8 Id. at 1212-13 (footnotes omitted).

9 Id. at 1211; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 191 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692g).
01 606 F.2d at 1211.
101 See id. at 1212.
102 Id.

at 1213.

103 Id.

104 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2697. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976) which provides in pertinent part:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following
methods: (1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal
case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree."
oI Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2697-98.

1983]

NOTES

properly in the court of appeals pursuant to section 1254 and accordingly, the Supreme Court could not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. 106
The Nixon Court decided that the district court's order met the
criteria of a "collateral order" as set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.,' 07 thus making it immediately appealable to
the court of appeals.' 0 8 According to the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen, a limited class of interlocutory orders can be appealed immediately to the court of appeals, provided that the orders "conclusively
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."' 10 9 Noting that the
present controversy concerned "a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers" 1 0 the Court
decided that a " 'serious and unsettled' " question had been presented
to the court of appeals and thus was immediately reviewable."'1
In rejecting Fitzgerald's second jurisdictional challenge, the
Court stated that an agreement between the parties as to the amount
of damages involved had not mooted the controversy."12 The Court
determined that both parties still had a recognizable financial interest
in the outcome of the lawsuit thereby preserving the viability of the
controversy."'
The Court next addressed the scope of immunity to which government officials are entitled. Justice Powell, writing for the Nixon

06 See id. at 2698.

337 U.S. 541 (1949).
101See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2698.
,o1Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
11 Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-92 (1974)).
" Id.; see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651
(1977).
12 See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2698-99. After Nixon had filed his petition for certiorari, he and
Fitzgerald. reached an agreement to liquidate damages. Id. Nixon agreed to pay Fitzgerald
$142,000 in exchange for Fitzgerald's promise to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 if the
Supreme Court ruled that Nixon was not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 2699. If the
former President were found to be absolutely immune, Fitzgerald would not be entitled to
receive the agreed upon sum of $28,000. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun opined
that the Nixon case was in effect settled by Nixon's payment of $142,000 to Fitzgerald. Id. at
2727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since the parties had settled the issue of damages by agreeing
not to bring any further proceedings, the case appeared to present nothing more than the
settlement of a "wager" which would result in the Court issuing a judgment somewhat akin to an
advisory opinion. Id. Justice Blackmun concluded that the Supreme Court should not have
exercised its power of discretionary review over the case. See id.
" Id. at 2699. See generally Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1120 (1982);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495-500 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 128 n.4
(1966).

SE TON HALL LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 13:374

majority, concluded that the former President should be accorded
. . immunity from damages liability for acts
within the
'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility.""14 The majority,
relying on our nation's history and the tradition of the separation of
powers, reasoned that this protection was "functionally mandated" by
the uniqueness of the Presidency."15
In rejecting Fitzgerald's contention that former President Nixon
was entitled only to qualified immunity, the Court found Scheuer and
Butz inapposite since these cases only addressed the scope of immunity
accorded executive officials other than the President.1 6 The Nixon
Court explained that the President was entitled to unique treatment
because he was the only executive official who derived his authority
from the Constitution. 1 7 The Court observed that the "singular importance" of the President in the "effective functioning of government" mandated that he be accorded absolute immunity." 8 Justice
Powell further noted that absolute Presidential immunity was necessary since the visibility of his office rendered the President particularly
vulnerable to civil actions for damages." 9 Defending private suits
would divert the President's attention from official duties thereby
jeopardizing the Presidency and the effective functioning of the entire
20
nation as well.1
Justice Powell also suggested that absolute Presidential immunity
was justified because this protection was rooted in the need to preserve
a balance between the three coordinate branches of the Federal Government.' 2' The majority noted that traditionally courts exercised
judicial deference and restraint concerning Presidential actions in
accordance with the separation of powers doctrine which mandated

"absolute .

Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2705.
I's Id. at 2701-02 (citing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1563, at 418-19 (1833)). Contra Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1210-11.
"I See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2702.
117 See id.
8 Id. at 2703. But cf. Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 429 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (fundamental to organized society that each individual be individually accountable
for acts).
.. See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2703. The Court reasoned that the President would be particularly
susceptible to private suits for monetary compensation since it was inevitable that his official
actions and decisions would affect the lives of millions of people. See id.; cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (judges granted absolute immunity for actions within judicial jurisdiction
since judges intimately affect lives of entire public and to perform properly must not be fearful of
consequences of actions).
...Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2703.
I See id. at 2703-04. See generally Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 475 (1866);
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
114
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that the judicial branch of the Federal Government refrain from
undue interference with activities of the executive branch. 122 The
Court continued that this principle, however, does not place Presidential actions outside the Court's jurisdictional review in every instance. 123 Rather, the Court maintained that jurisdiction is contingent
upon balancing the constitutional significance of the complainant's
interest against the possible harm resulting from interference with
executive branch functions. 124 The Court concluded that the situation
presented in Nixon did not warrant the exercise of jurisdiction because
judicial action was unnecessary "to serve broad public interests." 125
In granting the President absolute immunity, the Nixon Court
adopted a methodology heretofore never utilized in determining the
scope of immunity available to government officials. The Court rejected the traditional functional methodology which determined the
scope of immunity based on consideration of acts performed as functions of the office, 126 and instead adopted a methodology concentrating on the office itself to determine the scope of immunity. 27 Noting
that the President performed discretionary functions in various areas,
the Court reasoned that in many situations it would be difficult to
ascertain which of the President's numerous functions covered the
conduct in question. 28 Concluding that the functional approach advocated by Fitzgerald and the dissent would require "highly intrusive"
inquiries into the President's motives, the Nixon Court held this approach improper when evaluating Presidential immunity. 129
Fitzgerald also contended that by ordering his dismissal, Nixon
had acted beyond the perimeters of his duties, thus circumventing the
former President's immunity claim. 130 Refuting this contention, the

122

123

Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
Id. at 2704; see, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); cf. Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (jurisdiction exercised over Secretary of Commerce in
enjoining execution of direct Presidential order).
124 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2704; see Nixon v. General Servs. Admin., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974).
2 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2704.
2I See id. at 2705. For use of the functional methodology, see, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. at 508-17;
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976).
27 See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2705; cf. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363 & n.12 (1978)
(judiciary granted absolute immunity for acts performed outside "the normal attributes of a
judicial proceeding").
' Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2705.
912

Id .

Id. Fitzgerald argued that his discharge by the President was unlawful since the dismissal
was not ordered in furtherance of the best interests of the service, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513
(a) (Supp. III 1979). That section provides in pertinent part that "an agency may take an action
against an employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."
130
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majority stated that 10 U.S.C. § 8012(b) granted the President the
authority to designate the manner in which the Secretary of the Air
Force managed that agency's business. 131 Consequently, the Court
decided that Nixon had acted within the outer perimeter of his au32
thority by ordering the reorganization of the Department.
Finally, the majority reasoned that its decision did not leave
citizens without protection from Presidential abuses. 33 Formal and
informal checks on Presidential actions such as scrutiny by the press,
oversight by Congress, the threat of impeachment, and the desire to
be reelected, observed the Court, adequately safeguarded the nation
and assured the Court that its decision did not place the President
'above the law.' ,134

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized that
absolute Presidential immunity had its genesis in the separation of
powers doctrine. 35 The Chief Justice pointed out that instead of
granting "sweeping immunity" to a President for all acts, the Nixon
Court had merely granted a President absolute immunity from civil
damage suits.136 Furthermore, he maintained that a President would

137
not be protected from liability for acts outside his official duties.
Continuing his analysis, the Chief Justice distinguished United
States v. Nixon, 3 8 upon which the dissent relied to support its position. The dissenting opinion quoted language from that decision
which indicated that the separation of powers doctrine did not support absolute Presidential immunity from judicial process in all situations.1' 9 Chief Justice Burger, however, concluded that the rationale
employed by the Court in United States v. Nixon was inapplicable to
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, reasoning that, whereas the former case involved
a criminal prosecution, the latter case concerned a civil action for
money damages. 140 According to the Chief Justice, this rendered the

131 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2705. The statute, 10 U.S.C. § 8012(b) (1976), provides in pertinent
part that the Secretary of the Air Force "shall perform such other duties relating to Air Force
affairs, and conduct the business of the Department in such manner, as the President or the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe."
132 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2705.
133 See id. at 2705-06.
" Id. at 2706. See generally Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681
(1979).
'1-1 Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2706 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
138 Id.
137 Id.
138 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

See Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2718 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. at 706).
140 Id. at 2707 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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language quoted from United States v. Nixon inapposite to the civil
4
liability immunity issue. '
Chief Justice Burger also discussed the impropriety of judicial
probing into Presidential decision-making, asserting that private damage actions would lead to judicial questioning of Presidential conduct
resulting in inappropriate interference with the functioning of the
Presidency.' 4 2 Consequently, the need to. prevent judicial intrusion
upon the Presidency "far outweigh[ed]" the need to provide private
individuals the right to vindicate their claims. 143 The Chief Justice
additionally reiterated the majority's contention that forcing the President to defend private damage suits would divert the President's
attention from his duties, thus significantly impeding his effectiveness. 44 In conclusion, Chief Justice Burger observed that rather than
placing the President "above the law," the Court's holding merely
placed him on equal footing with other public officials who enjoyed
45
absolute immunity. 1
Unpersuaded by the public policy and constitutional arguments
advanced by both the majority and concurring opinions, the dissent
chided the Court for its refusal to follow the functional approach in
analyzing the immunity issue. In his dissent, Justice White contended
that absolute immunity should not attach to all Presidential functions
but should be extended only to those specific Presidential functions
requiring total protection. 146 The dissent did not consider the dismissal
of a federal employee to be within the range of Presidential functions
provided by the Constitution. 14 Accordingly, the function implicated
in Nixon did not merit complete protection because the President was
not involved in privileged condluct.148
Justice White further objected to the Court's holding noting that
it placed the President above the law and was a "reversion to the old

141

12

Id.
See id. at 2708-09 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

...Id. at 2708 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
' Id. at 2709 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
'5 Id.; see supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
t41See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2723 (White, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 2720 (White, J., dissenting). The functional approach to immunity treated Presidential conduct as absolutely protected if the conduct could be defined as a "constitutionally
assigned executive function, the performance of which would be substantially impaired by the
possibility of a private action for damages." Id. Justice White did not find the decision to
terminate Fitzgerald's employment to be a "constitutionally assigned presidential function that
will tolerate no interference by either of the other two branches of the government." Id. at 2723
(White, J., dissenting).
48 See id.
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notion that the King can do no wrong.-1 49 The dissent observed that
this holding permitted a President acting within the outer boundaries
of his normal duties deliberately to violate the Constitution and federal statutes and to escape liability for injury inflicted as a result of
1 50
conduct which he knew was clearly illegal.
Justice White also discredited Nixon's argument that absolute
Presidential immunity was recognized as implicit in the Constitution
during the Constitutional Convention debates and that impeachment
was intended to be the exclusive remedy for Presidential misconduct.'-5 The dissent commented that the Convention debates focused
on wrongs committed by the Chief Executive against the State, rather
than on wrongs against individuals. 52 Therefore, Justice White stated
that the framers of the Constitution did not intend that the impeachment remedy foreclose all other methods of holding the President
53
legally accountable. 1
Although the Nixon majority failed to apply the functional approach to immunity, the Harlow Court wholeheartedly supported its
application. Utilizing the functional approach, the Harlow majority
rejected the petitioners' claim that they were entitled to absolute
immunity based on the special functions which they performed as
White House aides. 154 Instead, the Court held that chief Presidential
aides generally enjoyed only a limited, qualified protection from civil
suits arising out of official acts. 55 This special functions rationale,
however, did not warrant total exemption from civil liability for all
Presidential assistants in the performance of their duties.' 5 To show
absolute immunity entitlement, a Presidential assistant had to demonstrate that his official responsibilities encompassed sensitive functions
MId. at 2711 (White, J., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun
agreed that no man, not even the President, was "absolutely and fully above the law." Id. at
2726 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 2709-10 (White, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at 2713-17 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White did not agree with Nixon's
contention that absolute immunity was an " 'incidental power' of the Presidency, historically
recognized as implicit in the Constitution." Id. at 2713 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent
explained that since diverse opinions concerning Presidential immunity were expressed at the
first Senate meeting, historical evidence demonstrated that Presidential immunity was as controversial in colonial times as it is now. See id. at 2713-17 (White, J., dissenting).
151Id. at 2713-14 (White, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2714-15 (White, J., dissenting).
154 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2735-36.
"I Id. at 2732-33. The Court noted, however, that the Chief Executive's aides who exercised
their discretionary power in the sensitive areas of national security and foreign policy might be
entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 2735; cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11
(decisions implicating foreign policy and military affairs are afforded more deference).
"' Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2735.
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requiring a complete shield from liability and that he was performing
such a protected function when he engaged in the act in question.157
The Harlow Court decided that neither aide had made this requisite
showing. 158
Additionally, the Court refused to grant absolute derivative immunity to Presidential aides, maintaining that this concept was irreconcilable with the functional approach to immunity. 59 The Harlow
Court's rationale, therefore, differed from that utilized in Gravel v.
United States,'60 in which the Supreme Court held that a ,Senator's
aide enjoyed the same absolute immunity from civil liability for legislative acts as that possessed by a Senator himself. 16 The Harlow Court
stated that this immunity attached only when aides performed " 'acts
legislative in nature' and not when taking other acts even 'in their
official capacity.' "162 Accordingly, the Harlow Court concluded that
Gravel, which supported derivative legislative immunity, did not
require that Presidential aides be granted immunity comparable to
that of the President. 163 The Court justified its decision by noting that
in Butz it had held that cabinet members, who are direct subordinates
of the President and often have greater responsibilities than White
House aides, possess merely a qualified immunity. 6 4 Therefore, the
Harlow Court maintained that it was unsound to accord the White
House staff greater protection from civil damages suits than that
granted to higher ranking cabinet officials. 6 5 Furthermore, the
Court, citing Scheuer and Butz, stated that qualified immunity was
66
the norm for executive officials.1
The Harlow Court modified the traditional qualified immunity
standard which provided that this defense was not available to an
official if he "knew or reasonably should have known" that his actions
violated one's constitutional rights or if he acted "with the malicious
intention" to deprive one of his legal rights. 67 The Court discussed the

Id. at 2736.
"I See id.
159Id. at 2735.
-60 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
161 Id. at 621-22. The Gravel Court reasoned that legislative aides were a Senator's "alter
egos" and therefore shared the Senator's constitutional privilege of absolute immunity for legislative acts. See id. at 616-17.
62 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2735 (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625); see also Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 125-33 (1979).
63 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2734-35.
164 Id. at 2734.
165 See id.
166Id. at 2733.
167 Strickland, 420 U.S. at 320-22; see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
157
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objective and subjective elements present in this good-faith defense,
finding that the objective component required that an official recognize and respect an individual's well established constitutional
rights, 168 while the subjective component required that an official
exercise " 'permissible intentions.' -1"1The Court eliminated the subjective element of qualified immunity whereby the good-faith defense
was unavailable to an official who maliciously caused injury to another.170 In so doing, it maintained that a plaintiff's mere allegations
of malice would no longer be sufficient to expose government officials
to the burdens of either trial or discovery. 171 The majority stated that
government officials should be liable for civil damages only if they
"violat[ed] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."'1

72

While recognizing

the public interest in deterring unlawful conduct and compensating
victims of official misconduct, the Harlow Court observed that
its holding protected the decision-making processes of officials, thus
promoting the effective operation of government. 7 3 By limiting the
qualified immunity defense to an objective standard, the majority
asserted that it had struck an appropriate balance between competing
interests of society. 174
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion, was unable to
reconcile Gravel and Harlow. He agreed with the Gravel Court's
reasoning that the purpose of providing a Senator with absolute immunity would be diminished and frustrated if his aides were not
extended equivalent protection. 175 Similarly, he asserted that the func-

See Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2737.
Id. (quoting Strickland, 420 U.S. at 320).
170 See id. at 2738.
171 Id. The Court recognized a valid interest in the quick disposal of a case involving an
official, reasoning that extensive and prolonged inquiries into an official's subjective motivation
could disrupt the efficient functioning of government. Id.
172 Id. (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978), Strickland, 420 U.S. at 321).
The Harlow Court offered no opinion "concerning the elements of the immunity available to
state officials" but noted that it was untenable to differentiate between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought against federal officials under the Constitution. Id.
at 2738 n.30.
' ' See id. at 2739.
'7' See id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority's standard holding an
official liable if he "knew or should have known" that his conduct was violative of constitutional
rights. Id. at 2740 (Brennan, J., concurring). He added, however, that occasionally it would be
necessary to engage in limited discovery in order to ascertain what was known by the defendant
when he acted. See id. at 2740; cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) ("impenetrable
barriers" to plaintiff's cause of action cannot be erected),
175 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2742-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
'6
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tioning of the Presidency would be adversely affected if Presidential
assistants were not accorded absolute derivative immunity. 76 The
Chief Justice emphasized that Presidential aides implemented their
superior's policies and, in effect, were the President's alter egos, thus
making them essential to the functioning of the Presidency. 77 Therefore, the dissent maintained that both Harlow and Butterfield should
enjoy absolute immunity since the same public policy considerations
which supported absolute immunity in Nixon and Gravel were appli7
cable to chief White House aides.1
Finally, the Chief Justice found Butz to be clearly distinguishable
from Harlow, contending that the Butz Court's determination of
qualified immunity for cabinet members did not dictate similar protection for Presidential aides.17 Chief Justice Burger noted that senior
White House assistants work on a daily basis with the President and
have a closer relationship with him than cabinet officers. 80 Accordingly, it was not inconsistent to hold that Presidential aides should be
accorded greater immunity than cabinet officials.' 8 '
Nixon and Harlow are predicated on the notion that government
operates efficiently only if certain officials are free to perform their
functions unhampered by the threat of civil damages suits. 8 2 Courts
employ a balancing of interests approach to determine the scope of
immunity available to officials whose actions are challenged. 8 3 Competing considerations include: compensating victims whose legal
rights are violated; deterring illegal conduct by government officers; 8 4 encouraging public servants to execute their duties vigorously
and fearlessly;1 5 and minimizing judicial interference with governmental action.'
The Nixon Court determined that compensation and deterrence
were outweighed by the resulting impairment of Presidential effectiveness which judicial scrutiny of Presidential action would effect.
Underlying Nixon is the premise that the rights of an individual can be

17
177

171

171

Id. at 2743-44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2742-43 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2743 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 2744 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

1so Id.
181 Id.
182

See generally Schuck, supra note 1, at 281 (discussing public policy considerations support-

ing immunity for government officials).
3 Id. at 282.
184 Id.
185 Id.; see also Ferrie v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979).
"I See Nixon, 102 S.Ct. at 2705; id. at 2707-09 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

394

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:374

sacrificed for the greater public good. The Court considered absolute
immunity as an incident of office necessary to promote the effective
functioning of the Presidency. 87 Furthermore, the majority determined that the separation of powers doctrine mandated that absolute
immunity from civil liability be accorded the President for actions
88
falling within the outer perimeter of his duties.
The Nixon Court thus granted absolute immunity to the former
President, limited by an apparent restriction. The outer perimeter test
proposed as a check on the Chief Executive's conduct fails to provide
adequate guidelines for determining the Presidential actions which
meet this threshold requirement for absolute immunity. In stating
that it would not intrude upon the President's decision-making process
by inquiring into his motives, 89 the Court made it impossible to
determine the acts which are properly within the scope of the President's duties, thereby effectively granting a President absolute immunity for virtually all his acts. This broad and inflexible result circumvents the constitutional safeguard that all officials, including the
President, observe limitations on their authority. 9 0 Since the Constitution operates as a check on the powers of the three coequal branches
of the Federal Government, it is specious to hold, as the majority did
in Nixon, that subjecting a President to constitutional restrictions
offends the doctrine of the separation of powers.191
The possible ramifications of Nixon are disturbing. The Court's
holding amounts to a recognition that the Chief Executive, because of
his office, may violate the law with impunity, thus belying the principle that all officials, "from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of
the law, and are bound to obey it."' 92 Determining the scope of
immunity by office rather than by function allows a President to act in
whatever manner he chooses without fear of liability. Therefore, even
if Nixon had known that the reorganization leading to Fitzgerald's
dismissal was contrary to the law, the former President would be
totally insulated from a civil suit. For purposes of the absolute immunity defense, it is irrelevant that Nixon's actions were taken for the
unlawful purpose of penalizing the exercise of statutorily and constitutionally protected rights. 19
181

Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2701, 2703.

189

at 2701, 2704-05.
See id. at 2705.

190

See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.

188 Id.

168, 191 (1880).
See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2724-25 (White, J., dissenting).
'0
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
'93 See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2709-10 (White, J., dissenting).
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The Nixon Court failed to recognize that the functional theory of
immunity affords adequate protection to a President. Under the functional theory, a court's central inquiry is whether the challenged act is
within the broad range of constitutionally derived Presidential functions and is of such a sensitive nature so as to require that the President
be absolutely immune for these acts. 19 4 Consequently, the President
would be absolutely immune for discretionary conduct within this
functional zone while other acts beyond the President's functions
would not warrant the identical level of protection.
The Harlow Court's refusal to extend absolute immunity to Presidential aides for all official actions should be equally applicable to the
President. The qualified immunity defense offers intermediate protection by insulating an official from damages liability unless he violated
"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' 9 5 This defense provides the President with sufficient protection since an immunity determination
would consider the broad responsibilities and unique discretion inherent in the Presidency. 96 Additionally, absolute immunity should not
be granted to the President for performing actions which a reasonable
person would have known are wrongful. Qualified immunity would
adequately protect the President by excusing him from liability for
bona fide errors in judgment and by requiring him only to refrain
from violating clearly established rights which a reasonable person
would have known.
Public policy does not mandate a blanket recognition of absolute
immunity for either the President or his aides. 9 7 Instead, policies
underlying the immunity doctrine can be effectively served through
the protection afforded by qualified immunity which seeks to vindicate innocent officials yet compensate victims of official transgressions
and deter future wrongful conduct.
Notwithstanding the Court's policy judgments, the most apparent ambiguity in Nixon concerns the scope of protection actually

194 See

id. at 2723; Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2736; see also Butz, 438 U.S. at 506.
'15 Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2738.
It is important to note that since the Harlow Court essentially eliminated the subjective
malice element of qualified immunity, government officials are no longer required to act in good
faith or to avoid malicious action. While technically a defeat for the Presidential aides, Harlow is
nonetheless a victory for government officials since they can no longer be sued for malicious
actions unless they knew or reasonably should have known that their actions were wrongful.
116See Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1212-13.
'10If Congress interprets public policy as requiring absolute Presidential immunity from civil
liability, it can enact legislation immunizing the President. See Nixon, 102 S. Ct. at 2725 (White,
J.,dissenting).
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conferred upon the President. The Nixon Court determined that although "Congress [has not] taken express legislative action to subject
the President to civil liability for his official acts, 19 8 the Court assumed arguendo that it could infer a cause of action premised on the
first amendment and the two federal statutes upon which Fitzgerald
relied.19 9 The Court then stated that its holding was limited to absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability for official acts
in the "absence of explicit affirmative action by Congress. ' 200 The
Nixon Court, therefore, did not examine the scope of immunity to
which the President would be entitled if Congress had explicitly pro20 1
vided a private cause of action.
The apparent restriction on the scope of the decision is inconsistent with the Nixon Court's justification for granting absolute Presidential immunity. Justice Powell maintained that the separation of
powers doctrine supported absolute immunity from civil liability for
the President. 20 2 This constitutional premise upon which absolute immunity is based, however, would also preclude Congress from providing a remedy against the President for misconduct. Thus by logically
extending the Nixon Court's analysis, even if Congress had taken
express action, the resulting legislation would be unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. The Nixon grant of absolute
immunity is, therefore, far more expansive than acknowledged by the
20 3
majority.
The Nixon Court failed to recognize that the separation of
powers doctrine mandates that the President be legally accountable
for interference with congressional action. Although observing that
Fitzgerald's causes of action would impair the effective functioning of
the Presidency, 20 4 the Court neglected to discuss the negative impact
of its decision on Congress, thus seemingly placing a higher premium
on Presidential functions. 20 5 Congress' purpose in enacting 5 U.S.C. §
7211 and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 was to enable government employees like
Fitzgerald to freely testify before congressional committees without
fear of retaliation. 20 ' The statutes were intended to curb Presidential
198 Id. at 2701.

"I Id. at

2701 n.27.

200 Id.
20, Id.
201 Id.

at 2701.
203 See id. at 2723-24 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White maintained that the Court's

opinion established that congressional legislation could not alter absolute Presidential immunity
which was grounded in the Constitution. See id.
204 Id. at 2703.
205 See id. at 2721 (White, J., dissenting).
20IId. at 2720 (White, J., dissenting).
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abuses of power and to assure congressional access to information
20 1 If
possessed by the executive branch of the Federal Government.
Congress is hindered in obtaining relevant information concerning the
activities of the executive branch, it cannot effectively perform its
"oversight" function . 2 08
Nixon and Harlow will have a broad impact on official immunity. Absolute immunity as granted in Nixon operates as a total bar to
suit thus precluding even meritorious claims and leaving aggrieved
victims of Presidential misconduct remediless. Exonerating the President from personal liability for official acts in every circumstance
contradicts the very purpose of Bivens-implying a damage remedy
for a constitutionally based violation. Meaningful enforcement of the
rights guaranteed by law entitles an aggrieved party to seek recompense from the President for statutory and constitutional violations.
Policy justifications favoring absolute immunity are not enough to
shield all Presidential actions from liability. Instead, the qualified
immunity "knew or should have known" test, enunciated in Harlow,
affords ample protection to all officials, including the President. This
standard of liability recognizes that recovery of damages is the most
effective means to remedy Presidential misconduct and prevent its
recurrence.
Mary-Lynne Ricigliano

207
211

Id.
See id. at 2721 (White, J.,dissenting).

